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Lorimer, Inglis and RLS: 
law and the kailyard lockup. 
 
Dr Paul Maharg 
 
 
 
Bystanders in Edinburgh's High Street, 16 July 1875 were probably astonished by the sight of 
a thin young man in advocate's wig and gown riding in an open barouche, making formal 
bows and waving to them as he passed.  The young man was Robert Louis Stevenson, 
celebrating his call to the Bar.  In a life not short on dramatic gesture, this was a particularly 
symbolic act.  It was a parody of the behaviour expected of a sober advocate, an ironic hail 
and farewell to a legal career, one in which he took four briefs and earned all of four guineas.  
Stevenson, of course, had little interest in pursuing a legal career.  His suspicion of the 
Scottish business classes went beyond a youthful desire to épater le bourgeoisie; 
temperamentally he was unsuited to walking the floor of Parliament House and, above all, his 
health would not have withstood the rigours of legal practice.1  However, if Stevenson's 
practical law career never took off, the effect of his legal education is clearly there in his 
work, particularly the later novels.  If we are aware of these references we can site 
Stevenson's texts beside other legal texts, and see them as contributions to the contemporary 
late nineteenth century debate regarding the place of law within Scottish history and culture.  
We can discern, too, elements of Enlightenment discourse in his novels stretching well 
beyond the eighteenth century, the vehicle of which, I would suggest, is Stevenson's 
familiarity with legal culture.   
 
 
I Stevenson's legal education 
 
Misunderstanding of the central place occupied by the law in Scots nineteenth century 
culture, and of the nature of Scots legal education have led commentators to misread the ways 
legal culture is deployed in Stevenson's work.  It is typical that Emma Letley, editing 
Kidnapped and Catriona for OUP's World Classics series described him as being 'called to 
the Scottish Bar but does not practise as a barrister' (p.xxxiii, my italics).  Stevenson became 
an advocate and did practise, albeit for two months only.  Letley's slip is symptomatic of the 
general misunderstanding of this part of Stevenson's life, particularly among his English and 
American commentators.  When they comment on it, it is usually to describe bohemian 
evenings spent in the Canongate, not his legal studies, or his knowledge of the legal 
profession; nor how this knowledge is deployed in his work.   
 
It has been part of the RLS myth that he was far from a model student.  As his latest 
biographer, Frank McLynn describes him, he attended classes intermittently, and only those 
in which he had some interest, and spent most of his time and effort in extra-curricular 
                                                
1 Lord Salvesen quotes Sir Edward Clerk who was asked what were the requisites for success 
at the Bar - '"There are three things necessary, and the first is health, the second is health, and 
the third is health"', Memoirs of Lord Salvesen, ed Harold F. Andorsen, (Edinburgh, 1949), 
pp.45-6. 
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reading and writing.2  But the fact that he became an advocate at all shows a fair degree of 
legal knowledge; and if we look closely at Stevenson's law studies we can discern a pattern of 
interest which surfaces in his mature fiction.3  In his recollections of Stevenson, Lord Guthrie 
has outlined the legal courses Stevenson would have undertaken at Edinburgh University in 
the period November 1867 - July 1875.4  With no degree in Arts, Stevenson had to sit the 
Faculty examination in General Scholarship.5  He passed Latin, Ethical and Metaphysical 
Philosophy, Mathematics, French and German.  He then went on to study Civil Law, Scots 
Law, Scots Conveyancing, Constitutional Law and History, and Medical Jurisprudence.  He 
also passed the Disputatio Juridica, a public examination held in Latin, which by the late 
nineteenth century was more a passing-out ritual than an examination.  As with all students, 
Stevenson had his favourite classes.  In Civil Law he sat merely five of the twelve 
examinations, just enough for a certificate; although by the time of his final examination he 
was apparently complimented on his knowledge of Civil Law.  But he showed considerable 
interest in Professor James Lorimer's class of Public Law, gained an 'honourable mention' and 
achieved third place in the class.6   
 
Stevenson's interest in this class is significant, particularly in the light of Lorimer's own 
approach to the study of jurisprudence, natural law, and legal history.  Lorimer had been 
appointed in 1862 to the newly revived Chair of Public Law and the Law of Nature and 
Nations at Edinburgh University.  His oeuvre constituted a distinctively Scots approach to 
these subjects and to jurisprudence, as he himself was aware: 
Had those great thinkers who rendered the Scottish School of Philosophy illustrious set 
before them the task of placing Politics and Jurisprudence on a scientific basis, Political 
Economy might, long ago, have ceased to be the only practical science for which the 
world was indebted to a Scotch professor.7   
                                                
2 Robert Louis Stevenson, A Biography (London, 1993), pp.40-1 
3  For an overview of nineteenth century legal education, see Stephen D. Girvan, 'Nineteenth-
Century Reforms in Scottish Legal Education: The Universities and the Bar', Legal History, 
vol.14, no.2 (1993), pp.127-141 
4Lord Guthrie, Robert Louis Stevenson: Some Personal Recollections, (Edinburgh, 1924), 
pp.36-8.  See also Memoirs of Lord Salvesen, op.cit., pp.19-20 
5 Albeit he got merit certificates in Mathematics and Political Economy.  Modern 
commentators and biographers take an unhistorical view of Stevenson's academic 
performance, and judge it by today's quite different standards.  As Davie points out, 'merit 
certificates were publicly accepted among the Scots as a guarantee of merit and the 
possession of two of them by a student who did nothing else might be reckoned of equal 
value to the pocketful of DPs acquired as a result of completing the full course' ('The 
Importance of the Ordinary MA' Edinburgh Review, Issue 90, 'Democracy and Curriculum', 
p.65) 
6 The Works of Robert Louis Stevenson, Vailima Edition, vol XXVI (London, 1923), 
Miscellanea, 'Notes about Robert Louis Stevenson from his Mother's Diary', pp.328; 322-3.   
7 The Institutes of Law: A Treatise of the Principles of Jurisprudence as Determined by 
Nature (Edinburgh, 1880, second edition), Preface, p.vii.  Lorimer's view is probably 
deliberately provocative.  That there was a deep interest in jurisprudential matters in the 
Enlightenment cannot be doubted.  At least two-thirds of Francis Hutcheson's System of 
Moral Philosophy (1755), for instance, as William Miller Galbraith pointed out, deals 
systematically with jurisprudence.  See The Law of nature and Nations in Scotland 
(Edinburgh, 1896), pp.11-14 
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One of the remarkable circle of writers, scientists and philosophers influenced by Sir William 
Hamilton's renovation of the commonsense tradition in philosophy, Lorimer's education and 
personal inclination led him to reject most of contemporary English jurisprudence.  He 
eschewed the utilitarianism of Mill as much as Austinian positivism and Sir Henry Main's 
comparative method.8  Instead, he declared his aim was 'to teach Natural Law', and he did so 
with a strong emphasis on the historical context of his subject: 
From many specialist points of view, unquestionably an historical treatment seems to 
offer the proper propaedeutic to the study of a system wh: has been the result of human 
experience, and wh: has been forced upon mankind by events, to a far greater extent 
than it has been reasoned out from a consideration of abstract principles.9 
 
We do not have far to seek for the origin of Lorimer's historicism.  Like many advocates of 
the period, he was familiar with the German historical school of jurisprudence, and studied 
under the post-Savigny generation - with Trendelenburg at Berlin and Dahlmann at Bonn.10  
Lorimer's approach to the study of jurisprudence was eclectic within the discipline as well as 
across disciplines and periods of history.  In his lectures he covered the history of 
international law from the pre-classical period to Grotius and beyond, and drew to the 
attention of his students non-European legal systems.11  One of his aims is clearly to 
introduce his student audience to the complex network of natural law debates; and in doing so 
he is often drawn into a description of the changing nature of contemporary historical 
awareness.  In the introduction to one lecture he attempted to define the process of historical 
legal analysis: 
We live in a 'historical age' as opposed to a philosl, in an age, that is to say, in which 
the main guidance to wh: men look for the future consists in the information which they 
possess with reference to the results of former experience.12   
Citing the university of Göttingen as a paradigm of the contemporary trend, where 'the 
historical teaching of jurisprudence has entirely superseded the philosophical', he went on to 
comment that  
                                                
8 For a rejection of Mill and Austin, for instance, see The Institutes of Law, op.cit, pp. ix and 
281 respectively. 
9 'Lecture XVII, Feby 2 1865, Sketch of Intl Law I.  The Oriental or Ante-Classical period', 
MS, Edinburgh University Library, Gen 101.  Beside this passage is a note in the margin - 
'Criticise Maine's Ancient laws'.  W. Galbraith Miller commented on this aversion, noting 
that Lorimer's position derived from Hamilton and Reid: 'examine any human relation, and 
you will find law is necessarily involved in it', Lectures on the Philosophy of Law (London, 
1884), p.30 
10 For evidence of contemporary advocates' interest in Germany, see Alan Rodger, 'The 
Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain', The Law Quarterly Review, vol. 109 
(Oct 1992), pp. 570-90.  It is interesting in this respect that Stevenson considered studying for 
a year at the University of Göttingen - see The Collected Letters of Robert Louis Stevenson, 
edited by Ernest Mehew and Bradford A. Booth (Yale, 1994), pp. 508, 514. 
11  'The literature of India furnishes innumerable monuments of the care with which the 
principles of natural law were elaborated into practical rules and realized in all those 
departments of private law which, in a very general way, we are accustomed to group under 
the head of Status, as opposed to Contract.  If you look into the laws of Manu, or into Sir 
William MacNaghten's Principles of Hindu Law, you will find that the whole of the Family 
relations are anxiously provided for.' (MS, Edinburgh UniversityLibrary, Gen 101.) 
12 Ibid 
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[a]s we have historians and philosophers, but scarcely philosophical historians or 
historical philosophers, so we rarely have generations which are in a condition to 
occupy both the philosophical and the historical points of view. 
Given the predominance of historical analysis, Lorimer defined the task of historical analysis 
as that of separating out the memorable in history; and he defined this as being what 
amounted to 'the necessary' in history as opposed to the merely 'accidental'.   
 
There are distinct elements of German Romanticism in Lorimer's treatment of history and law 
here and in his published works.  Like Fichte and Schiller, he viewed history as focused lines 
which converged upon the present.  Like Savigny he sites in the 'common consciousness of 
the people' (gemeinsamen Bewusstseyn des Volkes) the ground of positive law which 'for the 
consciousness of each, is one and the same law, not accidentally but necessarily'.13  If indeed 
Stevenson was influenced by Lorimer, it was in the extent to which law's discipline and 
culture was presented by Lorimer as rooted in Scottish politics and history; and the extent to 
which, in German historical jurisprudence, law was an embodiment of the historical 
consciousness of the people.14  This was a lesson which, as we shall see, was put to use in 
Stevenson's later fiction. 
 
 
II History and the lawyers in late nineteenth century Scotland 
 
Lorimer's interest in the relations between history and law was by no means a unique one.  
Throughout later nineteenth century Scots legal literature there was present a concern to 
investigate the relationship between law and history: not only how law was taught or 
researched within a university, but the relevance of legal history to Scots history and to 
contemporary historiography and society.15  That there had always existed a strong link 
between law and history was more reason to analyse the matrix.  In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries a large proportion of historians and antiquarians were also lawyers.16  
The nineteenth century clubs and societies initiating publication of their distinguished 
collections of historical documents were indebted to the backing of the legal establishment; 
and to an extent this was true of official publications as well.17  The figure of Sir William 
Fraser was a paradigmatic figure in this respect.  A lawyer by profession, he made his fortune 
researching genealogies, and as Deputy Keeper of the Records at Register House he oversaw 
one of the most productive periods in the publication of historical and public records.  He 
                                                
13 Institutes, op. cit., p. 440, my italics.  One might compare Lorimer's position here with that of Savigny in his 
declaratory article, 'Uber den Zweck dieser Zeitschrift', which he published in the journal he co-edited with K.F. 
Eichhorn, Zeitschrift für geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft (1815).  Lorimer was aware of the subjectivity 
inherent in his definition of historical necessity: 
It is a test, the legal application of wh: altogether excludes that picking and choosing of 
instances to suit their preconceived opinions, of wh: Savigny, not without reason, 
accused the apostles of the philosophers of history. 
14 See Institutes, op.cit, p.440 
15 A practical example of this was the current interest in codification in the area of 
commercial and business law see Alan Rodger, op.cit. 
16 For example, Lord Hailes, Lord Kames, William Tytler and Alexander Fraser Tytler (Lord 
Woodhouselee),  Sir Walter Scott, Lord Cockburn, Cosmo Innes, to name but a few. 
17 See for instance Marinell Ash, 'Scott and Historical Publishing: The Bannatyne and 
Maitland Clubs', Scots Antiquaries and Historians (Dundee Abertay Historical Society, 1972, 
Publication no.16).  These clubs and societies were inheritors of the Enlightenment 
encyclopaedic tradition.   
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also endowed the Chair of Ancient History (ie Scots history) and Palaeography at Edinburgh 
University.18   
 
But while the antiquarian research and publication of historical records was a considerable 
achievement in itself, all this worthy endeavour, as David Allan has pointed out, was 'a far 
cry from the speculative flights and all-encompassing interests' of Enlightenment lawyers.19  
In the later nineteenth century there appears very little historiographical analysis to match the 
riches of primary material being brought to light.  The reasons for this are complex: the 
historiographical nexus is still problematic.  According to George Davie, there was a 'failure 
of intellectual nerve': 
at the very time when other neighbouring countries were becoming increasingly 'history 
minded', the Scots were losing their sense of the past, their leading institutions, 
including the Universities, were emphatically resolved - to use a catch phrase 
fashionable in Scotland of the early twentieth century - 'no longer to be prisoners of 
their own history'.20 
Others have supported his view, from a variety of cultural angles.  Marinell Ash has 
described the state of historiography in later Victorian Scotland as 'a succession of historical 
kailyards', a view echoed by Michael Fry who, in criticising the Whig versions of Scots 
history promulgated by late nineteenth century historians, commented that their 
interpretations condemned Scottish historical culture to be 'locked for safekeeping in the 
kailyard'.21  Moreover, as Fry points out, these historians were eager to proclaim (pace 
Fukuyama) an end to Scottish political history, siting its demise at various high points of the 
Whig and Liberal ascendancy throughout the nineteenth century.22   
 
Nor did nineteenth-century English positivist historiography contribute much to the debate.  
T.H. Buckle's diatribe against Scottish intellectual history (History of Civilisation in England, 
vol III, 1861) and in particular the culture of the seventeenth century was notorious, but his 
was merely an extreme articulation of a view of Scots history and culture common among 
English historians.  In W.E. Lecky's History of England in the Eighteenth Century for 
example, Scotland is used as an instance of a dependent country being civilised by a 
                                                
18 Gordon Donaldson, Sir William Fraser, The Man and His Work (Edinburgh, 1985), pp.63-
4.  There are many other examples.  Apart from the important role played by Cosmo Innes, 
Aeneas Mackay, Professor of Constitutional Law at Edinburgh, was a founder member of the 
Scottish Historical and Scottish Texts Societies (Chris Harvie, 'Legalism, Myth and National 
Identity in Scotland in the Imperial Epoch', Cencrastus, no.26, (Summer 1987), p.39 
19 Virtue, Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment: Ideas of Scholarship in Early Modern 
History (Edinburgh, 1993), pp.237-8 
20The Democratic Intellect: Scotland and her Universities in the Nineteenth Century 
(Edinburgh, 1961), p. vii 
21 The Strange Death of Scottish History (Edinburgh, 1980), p.152; 'The Whig Interpretation 
of Scottish History' in I. Donnachie and C. Whately, editors, The Manufacture of Scottish 
History (Edinburgh 1992), p.83.  Fry quotes Henry Grey Graham, Social Life of Scotland in 
the Eighteenth Century (1899); Peter Hume Brown,  History of Scotland to the Present Time 
(1911); and H.W. Meikle, History of Civilisation in Scotland (1896), amongst others.  See 
also Davie, The Democratic Intellect, op.cit., pp.328-32, for the part played by Edward Caird 
(appointed to the chair of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow in 1866) in supplying a philosophical 
basis, derived from Hegelian monism, for this historiographical position. 
22 Fry, op cit,  pp.85-6 
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dominant one.  Lecky described pre-eighteenth-century Scotland as a nation 'for generations 
ignorant, superstitious, intolerant and enslaved', and its eighteenth century history as 
one of those remarkable instances on record of the efficacy of wise legislation in 
developing the prosperity and ameliorating the character of nations.23 
The 'wise legislation', of course, derived in his view from Scotland's political union with 
England.   
 
If in historiography, then, Scotland produced little to support the wealth of primary evidence 
which was being amassed and did little to explain the shape of its contemporary institutions 
to itself, part of the answer would seem to lie in a trahison des clercs amongst those 
historians who were concerned to close down history and depoliticise politics.24  There were 
alternative discourses, however, which provided different constructions of Scots history, law 
and culture.  Lawyers played an important role here, analysing the relations between history 
and law.  Apart from the distinguished scholarship of Cosmo Innes in this respect, James 
Lorimer revealed the close links between the study of Scots law and history in his lectures 
and essays.  As Professor of Public Law (albeit Innes held the Chair of Constitutional Law 
and History), Lorimer was clearly antagonistic to attempts by Whig lawyers and historians to 
narrow the field of historical inquiry.  For him, the function of history in a university law 
faculty was 'to be taught in relation, not to the development of constitutional government 
alone, but to political and social life generally'.25  Lorimer recognised the contemporary 
relations between politics, history and law, and recognised the interdependence of all three.  
Indeed, he welcomed what he perceived as the 'growing clearness' between politics and the 
legal profession - 'I have been for many years a strenuous advocate for the development of 
our Faculty of Law in the political direction'.26  His own work, in the field of contemporary 
international law as well as national education and in several other areas was proof of the 
extent to which law could energise and enrich contemporary intellectual debate; while his 
concern to retain the close relationship between historical study and the legal profession is 
proof of his certainty that dialogue between the two was essential.   
 
Other lawyers investigated questioned the nature of this dialogue.  William Galbraith Miller, 
lecturer in Public Law at Glasgow University asked the pertinent question in his Lectures on 
the Philosophy of Law -  
 
                                                
23 (London, 1878-92), II, 73-4; 92 
24 See also Ash, op cit, pp.148-9 
25 Studies National and International, Being Occasional Lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh, 
1864-1889 (Edinburgh, 1890), 'On the Sphere and Function of an Academical Faculty of Law', pp.12-13.  See 
also 'The Faculty of Law', p.248.  In his study of mid and later nineteenth century Scottish higher education 
Davie outlined the wider contemporary context to the educational debates, and pointed out the important part 
played by lawyers, and especially by Lorimer.  It was the Faculty of Advocates' report on the education of 
lawyers which formed the basis for the Association for Extension of Scottish Universities, whose 'memorial 
volume' was Scottish Universities, Past, Present and Possible, written by Lorimer (an advocate, of course, as 
well as a professor).  The Association  
was supported not merely by some of the greatest names in the academical world in Scotland...but also 
received notable backing from senior members of the legal profession, including, among others, Lord 
President Inglis.  (Davie, op.cit, p.47) 
R.D. Anderson, in Education and Opportunity in Victorian Scotland (Edinburgh, 1983), 
while criticising Davie's general conclusions, does not dispute this point. 
26 Studies National and International, op.cit., p.219.  Galbraith Miller grumbled that Lorimer 
'devoted his attention too exclusively to the political aspects of the [philosophy of law]',The 
Law of Nature and Nations in Scotland (Edinburgh., 1896), p.30 
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Is there nothing more than [an] external connection of law and history?  Is there no 
organic connection between them? This is a question of paramount importance, and 
deserves more than a mere passing notice.  It is at present attracting much attention ...27 
 
His question had been answered, in part, by Lord-President Inglis almost twenty years earlier, 
in an address to the Juridical Society entitled 'Historical Study of Law' (May 1865).  The 
address is in several respects a remarkable statement of the relations between history and law, 
and deserves more attention than it has received.  Inglis, the dedicatee of Cosmo Innes' 
celebrated Lectures on Scots Legal Antiquities (1872), begins by approving Lord Kames' 
dictum that 'Law is taught, like Geography, as if it were a collection of facts merely; the 
memory is employed to the full, rarely the judgment', and goes on to comment that the history 
and jurisprudence of Scots law was insufficiently studied by Scots lawyers.28  Inglis argues 
for a greater knowledge of both, not only on the grounds that this would increase lawyers' 
professional effectiveness, but more interestingly, on account of their significant roles in 
society: 
 
It has been said by one eminent writer, that the most important part of the history of any 
civilised nation is to be found in the Statute-Book, and by another that the true method 
of historical study is to elucidate and illustrate law by history, and history by law.29 
 
As Christopher Harvie points out, the context of the lecture is essential to an understanding of 
its meaning.30  It was given four years after the publication of Buckle's History of Civilisation 
in England, and can be interpreted as a robust critique of the view of Scottish culture 
contained therein.  Buckle scarcely mentions law in his attack; but in his lecture Inglis rises to 
the defence of legal culture.  His terminology ('civilised nation') and his analysis and praise of 
seventeenth century legislation in Scotland, 'unexampled either before or since' is a general 
riposte to Buckle.31  He then goes on in some detail to describe the Advocates' dispute of 
1670, interpreting their stance as 'an attitude of firm and deliberate resistance to an act of 
tyranny and injustice'.32   
 
Inglis' address is significant for a number of reasons.  He outlines for his audience a 
construction of Scots history and law which valorises that history contra Buckle.33.  More 
interestingly, he argues that such constructions are impossible unless the foundational 
relations between political history and law are understood.  In this context it is significant that 
he chooses to dwell upon an incident in which Scots lawyers resist the wishes of the political 
                                                
27 (London, 1884), p.396 
28 James Crabb Watt John Inglis, Lord Justice-General of Scotland, A Memoir (Edinburgh, 
1893), pp.376-7. 
29 Ibid, p.378 
30 Harvie, op cit, p.39 
31 John Inglis, op.cit, p.379 
32 Ibid, p.391 
33 In this respect, his view of seventeenth century legal culture in Scotland had to wait over a 
century before it was matched by similar revisions by historians of the view that Scotland 
was a backward and violent society in the seventeenth.  See for instance J.W. Cairns' subtle 
analysis, 'Institutional Writings in Scotland Reconsidered', in New Perspectives in Scottish 
Legal History, ed Albert Kiralfy & Hector MacQueen (London, 1984).  For a polemical view, 
see C. Beveridge and C. Turnbull, The Eclipse of Scottish Culture: Inferiorism and the 
Intellectuals, (Edinburgh, Polygon, 1989) 
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administration.  He does not draw direct political morals from his address - his description of 
the Advocates' dispute is certainly no call to the barricades, nor would one expect this from a 
high Tory who adhered firmly to the political creed of conservative 'lairds and law agents'.34  
What he does do, though, is draw if not an organic connection then an implied sine qua non 
connection, one where a knowledge of history is an essential pre-requisite to understanding 
law, and one where lawyers as a class can uphold essential constitutional freedoms because 
of their historical awareness of the importance of these freedoms.   
 
This historical jurisprudence was of direct interest to his audience.  Inglis' view of the proper 
place of lawyers in society is a later nineteenth century version of an Enlightenment argument 
in defence of the Union of Parliaments, which allotted to lawyers the task of forming 'a 
patriot-elite which was wise and virtuous enough to be able to preserve [Scotland's] national 
interests within the framework of a new British polity'.35  Inglis himself provided such an 
example in his own life, for as Davie points out, he played a major part in the Royal 
Commission on the Scottish Universities (1858), and in drafting the subsequent Act which, 
according to Davie, did much to protect the character of Scottish higher education.  Inglis' 
shrewd awareness of the political relations between history and law links him in a remarkable 
way with modern post-structuralist historiography: 
History is not a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise, but ... it is inaccessible to us 
except in textual form, and ... our approach to it ... necessarily passes through its prior 
textualisation, its narrativization in the political unconsciousness.36 
Inglis' point is the ineluctably political context of law within history and the need for lawyers 
in particular to remember this; Jamieson's that the textuality of history is necessarily political: 
both converge in acknowledging the problematic and controversial nature of the relationships 
between law, politics and history. 
 
 
III Law, history and politics in Catriona 
 
If modern critics have begun to recognise the complexity of the historiographical and literary 
nexus within which novelists and historians such as Scott and Macaulay wrote, the same 
cannot be said for the debatable lands between nineteenth century law and history and 
literature; and this is particularly true of Stevenson's oeuvre.37  Literary critics have 
                                                
34 David McCrone, Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation, 
(International Library of Sociology, Routledge, London, 1992), p.129 
35 N.T. Phillipson, The Scottish Whigs and the Reform of the Court of Session 1785-1830 
(Edinburgh, 1990) pp. 179-80 
36 Frederic Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act, Ithaca, 
1981, p.35, quoted in R. James Goldstein, 'Representation of Women in Literature and 
History', in Studies in Scottish Literature, G. Ross Roy et al. (editors), University of South 
Carolina, 1991, p.274 
37 See for example Ina Ferris, The Achievement of Literary Authority: Gender, History, and 
the Waverley Novels (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1991); Hayden White, Metahistory: 
The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (Baltimore, 1973);Hans Kellner, 
Language and Historical Representation: Getting the Story Crooked (University of 
Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1989); Mark Phillips, 'Macaulay, Scott and the Literary Challenge 
to Historiography', Journal of the History of Ideas, pp.117-133, especially pp.123-4.  Phillips 
notes that 'Macaulay's letters and diaries are filled with references to his novel reading, a 
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contextualised his work within a late nineteenth century literary tradition, but little attention 
has been paid either to the legal context of his Jacobite novels or the changing nature of the 
literary canon within which Stevenson wrote.  The historical novel in the late nineteenth 
century inhabited a much reduced estate compared to that of the Waverley novels. - indeed 
the contemporary diminishing reputation of the Waverley novels is a good indicator of this.  
Henry James, for instance, remarked that to read them 'we must again become as credulous as 
children at twilight'.38  The place occupied by Scott's novels was that allotted to historical 
fiction generally in the late nineteenth century hierarchy of literary genres: such novels were 
banished from the higher genres of domestic novel, or realist fiction.  Stevenson, therefore, 
wrote in a tradition now serving children rather than the serious adult fiction reading 
population: it had become 'the category of the romantic, the superficial, and the naive'.39  This 
changed canonical status imposed its constraints upon Stevenson's writing, and we can see in 
Kidnapped and Catriona Stevenson outgrowing these constraints.  Bound by stereotypes and 
working within a child-like, apolitical narrative at the start of Kidnapped, by the time he 
came to write Catriona he was clearly writing beyond the bounds of his child audience.  
Critics, however, have generally treated the novel as a univocal child's tale, and ignored or 
underplayed the dialogic complexity of its voices and legal references.40 
 
Noble, for instance, has dismissed Stevenson's Jacobite novels as 'Highland history moulded 
by Scott's fictional conventions'; but without mentioning the strikingly different ways both 
authors narrativise legal culture.41  Scott insisted publicly on the historical integrity of detail 
and description in his novels: there are introductions explaining the background; lengthy 
notes attached to the novels (added to the Magnum Opus edition), and within the texts 
narrators digress to explain customs, events, historical characters, and so on.42  Stevenson has 
no such pre-text material.  Instead he creates elliptical narratives where events and political 
positions are outlined briefly, and where single quotations and phrases stand for much longer 
strings of argument.  Far from Stevenson's narratives being moulded by Scott's literary 
conventions, we could, to quote Harold Bloom, see in Stevenson's use of legal culture a 
clinamen or creative swerve from precedent, a deliberate avoidance of the strategies and 
positions of his distinguished predecessor.43   
                                                
habit which his father sternly criticized' (p.119).  Inglis reread Scott's Waverley novels 
annually. 
38 'Senior's Essays on Fiction', North American Review, 99(1864), pp.580-87, p.587; quoted 
in Ferris, p.237 
39 Ferris, op. cit., p.238. 
40 An exception is Susan R. Gannon, 'Repetition and Meaning in Stevenson's David Balfour 
Novels', Studies in the Literary Imagination, XVIII, No.2.  Mikhail Bakhtin's distinction 
between the dialogic text (in which there is an interplay of different voices, political, cultural 
and axiological) and monologic text (where a single voice controls and dominates the 
narrative) is applicable to Catriona.  See Mikhail Bakhtin, 'Epic and Novel', in The Dialogic 
Imagination, translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin, University of Texas 
Press, 1981), p.33 
41 Ibid, p.138 
42 See, for instance, Quarterly Review, 16 (1817), pp.430-80, and Scott's defence that in his 
portrayal of the covenanters in Old Mortality, he 'acted in strict conformity with historical 
truth' (p.460), quoted in Ferris, op. cit., p.151.  For an analysis of the additions to the 
Magnum edition, see Jane Millgate, Scott's Last Edition: A Study in Publishing History 
(Edinburgh University Press, 1987). 
43 See, for example, Yeats, (Oxford, 1970), p.7 
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And yet we can discern in Catriona and other texts Stevenson produced in his later life an 
urge similar to Scott's to explore the relations between law and society.  A Footnote to 
History for instance, in which Stevenson relates the contemporary colonial crises in Samoa, 
begins with a chapter that describes first the constitutional history of Samoan kingship, then 
the concept of property and forms of contract developed by Samoan society.44  Moving from 
public and constitutional law to private, the chapter follows, in miniature, the traditional 
pattern of a nineteenth century student's general legal handbook.  Stevenson uses the terms 
and definitions of Scots law to describe unfamiliar Samoan concepts to his audience.  At one 
point, for instance, he compares the return a beggar was supposed to make to a benefactor to 
'the Roman contract of mutuum'.45  Stevenson's rhetorical intentions in this text are clear: he 
counters his audience's implicit Eurocentric bias and denies them the opportunity to excuse 
European imperialist depredations by simply dismissing Samoan culture as savage.  By using 
the concepts of western legal and constitutional culture, he accords Samoans the status of a 
'civilised' nation such as Great Britain.  At the same time, his management of the discourse is 
adroit, for he clearly appreciates the irony of his description: Samoans, (to those of his 
readers who were aware of the situation's conflict of laws), are portrayed as considerate of 
European niceties as to the proper conduct of warfare: 
Thus after Mataafa [a Samoan chief] became involved with hostilities against the 
Germans, and had another code to observe besides his own, he was always asking his 
white advisors if 'things were done correctly'.46 
 
Similar concerns regarding the nature of law and its effect in society are present in 
Stevenson's most overtly 'legal' novel, Weir of Hermiston.  Stevenson's characterisation in the 
novel is clearly influenced by his early saturation in legal culture.  Lord Braxfield for instance 
is often taken to be the model of Hermiston, and this is confirmed by Stevenson's letters.47  
But a strong case could be made for Lord President Inglis as a model for Hermiston.  In his 
personal recollections of Inglis, William Knight quotes the observation of a contemporary of 
Stevenson, the advocate Alexander Taylor Innes -  
in real life [Stevenson] had held that the head of our Court in the Seventies was 'the 
greatest man in Scotland'; a man who in external aspect impressed both Stevenson and 
his brethren as (in the words of one of the cleverest of them) 
'The rhadamanthine, adamantine Inglis.' 
So, when years after he drew the 'adamantine Adam' Weir, he made him a parishioner 
of 'that beautiful church of Glencorse in the Pentlands, three miles from his father's 
country house at Swanston', for the 'adamantine Inglis' was 'Lord Glencorse', taking his 
title, as so many of our judges do, from his lairdship there.  Stevenson indeed called the 
parish Hermiston ... 
Once we appreciate the parallel, the character of Weir can no longer be interpreted simply as 
a parodic version of Braxfield.  It becomes a depiction of the power wielded by individuals in 
the name of law and on behalf of society.  Braxfield and Inglis were entirely different 
personalities, of course: what unites them in Stevenson's fictional construct is the sense of 
absolute and chthonic power which, in the case of Inglis, most of his contemporaries 
                                                
44 The Works of Robert Louis Stevenson, op cit vol XVI. pp. 451-64. 
45 Ibid, p.461 
46 Ibid, p.458 
47 Letter to Charles Baxter, Vailima, 1 December 1892 RLS: Stevenson's Letters to Charles 
Baxter, ed. DeLancey Ferguson and Marshall Waingrow (New Haven, 1956), p.314, note 6 
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remarked upon.48  The nature of that power, its origins in personality and legal system and its 
effect on society fascinated Stevenson - as Christopher Harvie pointed out in an article on 
Stevenson's politics,  
Weir was an image of the power of that legal system which underlay the Scots 
enlightenment, yet which was drawn from a pre-existent social state not unlike that 
which Stevenson himself tried to recreate in Samoa: a charismatic authority [which in 
Samoa was] being sapped by imperialist bureaucrats as much as by socialistic 
bureaucrats at home.49 
 
But it is in Catriona that we can see Stevenson engaging most clearly with the political 
context of legal history.  The novel splits into two parts, the first much longer part dealing 
with issues of criminal justice and public policy, while the second treats of David's relations 
with Catriona and her father.  In the first half Stevenson explores the legal issues of the novel, 
based as they are upon the murder of Colin Campbell of Glenure and its consequences.  
These issues centre, I would argue, upon an examination of the crucial relationship between 
politics and law in mid-eighteenth century Scotland.  Stevenson himself was in no doubt 
about the book's main concern: 
I have ... finished the chapter of the law technicalities.  Well, these seemed to me 
always of the essence of the story, which is the story of a cause célèbre ; however, they 
are the justification of my inventions; if these men went so far (granting Davie sprung 
on them) would they not have gone so much further?50 
 
The cause célèbre is of course the notorious trial and execution of James Stewart and David's 
failure to save an innocent man.  This failure is central to the historical, legal and aesthetic 
structure of the novel.  It is embedded in the narrative as the rhetorical trope of anti-climax: 
David's attempts to give testimony at the trial; the inconclusive duel; Alan nearing danger but 
escaping (twice); David neutralised on Bass Rock; the crucial evidence which remains 
unspoken; the entire absence of a trial narrative; the stalling love affair between David and 
Catriona; the law career abandoned (and the irony of David's real education in law in the 
novel's first half); the description of impotent Jacobite exiles abroad; the wry, self-
deprecating ending.  The trope of anti-climax, though, is only one of many rhetorical devices 
Stevenson uses.  In this novel more than any other Stevenson worked within a style which 
focused intensely on the local and locale; one which through parallelism, dualism (for 
instance the complex balancing of pairs of characters across political divides - the principled 
Prestongrange and Alan over against the unscrupulous James More and Simon Lovat), 
allusion, ellipsis, irony, metonymy and anti-climax analyses the complexity of the relations 
between politics, law and society.  If there was any English novelist akin to Stevenson in this 
respect, it was - paradoxically, given the opacity of his narratives - George Meredith, for 
whose fiction Stevenson had great admiration.   
 
The result of the above rhetorical devices is a texture of prose in the Jacobite novels more 
densely referential and dialogic than appears at first glance.  This is particularly evident in 
Stevenson's treatment of lawyers in Catriona.  It is notable, first of all, that the honest and 
redoubtable Rankeillor is missing from the novel.  There was ample opportunity to introduce 
him - on David's escape from the Bass Rock, for instance, in which he plays a part - so we 
                                                
48 See, for instance, Memoirs of Lord Salvesen, op cit, pp.146-9 
49 Christopher Harvie, 'The Politics of Stevenson', in Stevenson and Victorian Scotland 
(Edinburgh, 1981), p.124 
50Letters,  Vailima Edition, vol.XXIII p.226 
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may take his absence as deliberate decision by Stevenson, the reason for which we do not 
have far to look.  In place of Rankeillor, scrupulous to a point, we have lawyers with a much 
more complex set of motives embedded in politics, clan bloodfeuds, personal ambitions and 
realpolitik: Stewart the Writer, deeply if reluctantly implicated in clan politics; the Lord 
Advocate, William Grant, Simon Lovat, and the self-serving advocates at the trial in 
Inveraray.  Stevenson portrays the political heart of the legal establishment in mid-eighteenth 
century Scotland, and does so in the context of a case which was famous in its day for its 
political implications.  Will the Crown adhere to strict rules of procedure and evidence, or 
will it bow to political pressure, from Argyll as well as London.  Stewart the Writer is in no 
doubt- '"This is not a case, ye see, it's a conspiracy"' - and he is bitter at the injustices of the 
prosecution's actions: imprisonment of witnesses ('"clean in the two eyes of the act of 
Parliament of 1700, anent wrongous imprisonment"', (p.72)), and non-publication of the libel 
to the defence(p.74).   
 
David performs a useful role here as the political naïf who, with vital evidence, throws 
himself upon the mercy of the Lord Advocate, and deepens that law officer's dilemma.51  
That dilemma arises from a conflict between justice and politics.  The case is thus not just 
one of criminal justice gone bad, but one where public justice is seen to be subservient to 
public policy and the demands of government.  Prestongrange is frank about the conflict of 
interests he is faced with - 'patriotism is not always moral in the formal sense ... I regard in 
this matter my political duty first and my judicial duty only second.'(p.33) - and he reveals the 
doctrinal basis of his view: 
'This is a political case - ah, yes, Mr Balfour! whether we like it or no, the case is 
political - and I tremble when I think what issues may depend from it.  To a political 
case, I need scarce tell a young man of your education, we approach with very 
different thoughts from one which is criminal only.  Salus populi suprema lex is a 
maxim susceptible of great abuse, but it has that force which we find elsewhere only 
in the laws of nature: I mean it has the force of necessity.  '(p.32) 
 
The arguments raised by Prestongrange here rest on the Ciceronian doctrine he quotes (De 
Inventione, I,ii,2; De Legibus, III, ii, 8).  According to it, the public commonweal is the true 
historical legitimation of political authority.  Cicero's argument was highly influential and 
regarded as authoritative by subsequent political, jurisprudential and historical commentators 
including John Mair, Boece, Suarez and Stair.  Buchanan, for instance, declared that 'the 
people have the power to conferre the Government on whom they please'; Samuel Rutherford 
stated that government proceeded 'from God by mediation of the consent of a Communitie, 
which resignith their power to one or moe Rulers' and for the historian Robert Fleming, 
writing an anti-Jacobite tract in 1711, the 'Grand and Final end of all Government [is] the 
Salus Populi the good of the Community.  So that God and Man agreed then, that this was 
                                                
51 It is interesting to note that Stevenson portrays William Grant not as a Scottish minister, 
which is the role that Omond, writing his history of the office in the late nineteenth century, 
assigned to eighteenth century Lord Advocates (G.W. Omond, The Lord Advocates of 
Scotland from the Close of the Fifteenth Century to the Passing of the Reform Bill, 
Edinburgh, 1883).  Rather, Stevenson shows us the uneasy position of Grant's office, caught 
between local politics and Hanoverian public policy, a position that accords with 
contemporary analyses - see The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia 
(Edinburgh 1992), vol. 13, para 1269 
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Suprema Lex, the Fundamental Maxim of all Government'.52  Prestongrange, therefore is 
merely one voice in a long political tradition ; but the circumstances of the trial render his 
words ironic.  Buchanan, after all, was criticising the Stewart state on account of its 
oppressive character; Prestongrange uses the doctrine to justify judicial injustice, and in his 
mouth the maxim speaks of a society whose fundamental legal rights are being abused for 
political ends.  Furthermore, Prestongrange's appeal to necessitarian fatalism does not square 
with Cicero's vigorous civic activism.53  Rather, his appeal to 'the force of natural law' can be 
interpreted as the classic Whig claim to enjoy the favour of providential intervention, 
especially after the repeated failure of Jacobite invasions.  Nor did this political argument 
lean only on classical precedent: legitimation was discovered in Biblical texts.  Not for 
nothing in chapter 16 does Stevenson have the minister at the Inveraray assize comment on 
the apparent conflict of Romans 5 and 13, with the latter text traditionally one used to 
advocate religious and political conformism - 'the law itself must be regarded as a means of 
grace'.54 
 
Nor by any means had the relevance of the concept behind Cicero's maxim faded in the later 
nineteenth century.  It is central to Stevenson's anti-imperialist writings on Samoa in A 
Footnote to History.  It lies behind Inglis' address to the Juridical Society, and his vision of 
lawyers as guardians of constitutional freedoms.  Lorimer, Stevenson's professor of Public 
Law at Edinburgh and to whose classes in natural law Stevenson paid particular attention, 
dwelt on the same doctrine:  
No one attaches greater importance to opinion, or holds more firmly than I do to the 
maxim that all sovereignty, all real power, national and international, centres, 
necessarily and rightfully, in the general will.  Deliberately expressed, and faithfully 
interpreted, the vox populi is, indeed, the vox Dei - it is the form in which the divine 
will expresses itself for the time being, with reference to passing events. 
Lorimer, though, was well aware of the part interpretation played in determining the general 
will: 'though the general will cannot be resisted, it may be misinterpreted' as well as abused; 
and it is in comparing Lorimer's and Inglis' use of the doctrine with Prestongrange's that we 
can appreciate the real irony of the 'great abuse' of which Prestongrange speaks.55   
                                                
52 George Buchanan, De Jure Regni Apud Scotos Dialogos (ed. and translated Philalethes [ ], 
1680, p.19, quoted in David Allan, Virtue, Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment: Ideas of 
Scholarship in Early Modern History, Edinburgh University Press, 1993, p.33; Samuel 
Rutherford, Lex Rex: The Law and the Prince London, 1644, p.5, quoted Allan op.cit, p.35; 
Robert Fleming, History of Hereditary-Right, London, 1711; both Rutherford and Fleming 
quoted in Allan, op.cit, p.35.  Rutherford was cited by Lorimer in a list of commentators he 
lectured upon in the history of the law of nations - MS, Edinburgh University, Gen 101.  
Phillipson, op. cit., p.177, has also commented upon the 'interest of the Scottish 
enlightenment in a neo-Ciceronian concern with utilitas and the role of wisdom and virtue in 
shaping the civic mind and advancing the progress of liberty in a modern state'. 
53 See De Officiis, I, 6, and Allan, op. cit, pp.82-5 
54 See, for example, Marsilius of Padua, Defensor Pacis, 2.xxvi:13, The Defender of Peace, 
translated by Alan Gewirth, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1956), pp.353-6.  
Marsilius refers here to both Romans 13 and Cicero De Officiis, I.vii.23 and I.xvii.58. 
55 James Lorimer, Studies National and International, op.cit, p.31.  See also The Institutes of 
Law, op.cit., Book III, chapter IV - 'The Doctrine of the Necessary Sovereignty of the 
Rational Will of the Whole Community is in Accordance with the Common-sense of 
Mankind', pp.437-47.  Lorimer focuses here on elaborations of the doctrine by Kant and 
Savigny. 
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Prestongrange's argument can also be set in the context of the Romantic historical 
jurisprudence Stevenson received from Lorimer.  In his Institutes of Law, for instance, 
Lorimer rejected the jurisprudential distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations, 'of 
which the first are said to possess and the second to want, those inherent qualities which 
warrant the use of force to secure their fulfilment.'56  He emphasised instead the reciprocity 
and co-extension of rights and duties.  David struggles with Prestongrange's sharp division 
between political and criminal cases, and his own allegiances, and discovers that, like 
Lorimer, he cannot draw 'an imaginary line which is supposed to mark off the sphere of 
ethics from that of jurisprudence'.57  David's purposefulness, his instrumentality, involves a 
moral choice: for him as for Lorimer and Stevenson, instrumental reason implies moral 
reason, and neither of these are divorced from political concerns.  His predicament is a fine 
example of Savigny's doctrine of the origin of positivist law as being in the 'common 
consciousness of the people', the source equally of private and public law, 'for the generation 
of the state is, in a sense, the generation of the law'.58  Prestongrange's actions sin against 
David's concept of the law; for David seeks a solution which satisfies all the obligations 
within which he is latticed - those of friendship, law, political inclination, patriotic duty and 
self-preservation . 
 
The irony with which Stevenson invests the character and argument of Prestongrange applies 
also to David.  Critics have too often associated David's position with Stevenson's.  David's 
choice is taken by commentators as a product of Stevenson's own conservative politics, and 
his refusal to question Scotland's place in the Union, or to answer the real issues of public 
policy which the trial of James Stewart raised.59  This equation is too simple, too univocal 
and ignores the dialogic and ironical distance between David and Stevenson.  As Stevenson 
pointed out,  
till the day he died, Davie was never sure of what P. [Prestongrange] was after.  ...  But 
Davie cannot know; I give you the inside of Davie, and my method condemns me to 
give only the outside both of Prestongrange and his policy.60 
                                                
56 Op.cit, p.282 
57 Ibid, p.284.  For a modern natural law account of this, see Deryck Beyleveld, The 
Dialectical Necessity of Marality: An Analysis and Defense of Alan Gewirth's Argument to 
the Principle of Generic Consistency (University of Chicago Press, 1991) 
58 Institutes of Law, op.cit,, p.440 
59 As a Tory Stevenson supported the Union, but this support was lukewarm at best.  I agree 
with J.C Furnas that Stevenson's Unionism was 'dabbling in contrast to the deeper 
commitments of his South Sea years', and probably influenced by W.E. Henley's unionist and 
imperialist politics.  See 'Stevenson and Exile', in Stevenson and Victorian Scotland, ed Jenni 
Calder (EUP, 1981), p.138.  Stevenson became highly critical of British jingoism, as of 
imperialism generally - see, for example, 'Protest on behalf of Boer Independence' - (Vailima 
Edition, vol 24, p.241), a letter to the press supporting the Transvaal rebellion of Paul Kruger. 
 
It is interesting to note that while on holiday in the Highlands in 1880 Stevenson mentioned 
to Principal Tulloch his intention to write a history of the Union - see Mother's Diary, op.cit, 
p.336.  Emma Letley points out that Stevenson planned to write on the murder of Colin 
Campbell as part of his application for the post of Professor of History and Constitutional 
Law at Edinburgh University.  See also Richard Lodge, 'A Candidate for the Chair of History 
at Edinburgh University in 1881', History in Scottish Universities, vol. 4, (1930-1), p.101 
60 Letters, Vailima edition, London 1912, vol XXIV, p.223 
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The inside of Davie is, after all that happens, a Whig laird loyal to the Hanoverian succession 
- it was by no means the inside of Stevenson, who was an equivocal Tory at best.  David 
discovers that the politics of the law are deeply problematic: criminal justice, protected by the 
articles of the Union, is compromised by the necessity for private revenge and public 
example.  Stevenson gives us David's dilemma without a solution in the realm of public 
policy.  Instead, he manoeuvres the narrative subtly between Prestongrange's policy and 
David's dilemma so that the first part of the novel ends in stalemated failure.  At the end of 
the day David gives no evidence.  The first half of the novel, which has been leading up to his 
testimony, peters away in anti-climax.  He remains frustrated in his aim, listening to the trial 
verdict from the justices' private room (p.148), that private room a parallel to his more 
spacious imprisonment on the Bass Rock and a precursor of the tenement room in Leyden 
where the whole of his legal studies shrinks to a single volume of Heineccius, to be flung on 
the fire.  As a result of the trial, David loses faith in the efficacy of public life, and resolves to 
retreat to his own private enclave:  
But I had had my view of that detestable business they call politics ... and I was cured 
for life of any temptations to take part in it again.  A plain, quiet, private path was that 
which I was ambitious to walk in, when I might keep my head out of the way of 
dangers, and my conscience out of the road of temptation. 
 
 
IV Law and the kailyard lockup 
 
Douglas Gifford suggests that 'the first part of Catriona ends with what I read as a crucial 
abdication on Stevenson's part from involvement in "the condition of Scotland"'.61  David's 
analysis, it is true, rarely goes beyond defending his own position, caught between his Whig 
patrons and the self-serving advocates who are to represent his conscience at the trial.  The 
political analysis is local and remains at the microcosmic level; the novel does not consider 
macrocosmic constitutional politics at any length.  There are at least two reasons for why this 
is the case.  First, Stevenson was uninterested in extended political analyses and he disliked 
the obvious fictional candidate for legal and political debate, the so-called 'condition of 
England' novel (represented, for instance, by Disraeli's novels).  He was repelled by the 
realist novel, with its depiction of the dissolution of civil society, as in Zola, and its panoptic 
and densely figured plots.  Instead, he created from the constraints of a children's genre a 
metonymic style of narrative, one just as allusive as Inglis' address, and as historically rooted 
as Lorimer's lectures, but one which was highly dialogic and presented a sophisticated debate 
regarding the function of law and lawyers in Scottish history and society. 
 
Secondly, Stevenson is writing about the condition of law in Scotland.  David's failure and 
James' death is not the result of political expediency alone, but also of the political will of 
those lawyers who operate the judicial system.  Stevenson's ironical portrayal of the Lord 
Advocate's role in the affair as well as of the self-serving lawyers in Inveraray functions as a 
critique of the progressive Whig interpretation of history presented by Prestongrange.62  If we 
                                                
61 'Stevenson and Scottish Fiction', in Stevenson and Victorian Scotland, op.cit, p.67 
62 Prestongrange's interpretation follows that of his political masters.  Ernst Mayer, quoting 
H. Butterfield, points to the origin of the phrase 'Whig interpretation of history' and 
incidentally describes how Prestongrange views the '45 and its consequences -  
'The expression 'whig interpretation of history' was proposed by the historian H. 
Butterfield to characterize the habit of some English constitutional historians of seeing 
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compare the novel to Inglis' address and Lorimer's lectures, we can discern its interest as a 
critique of legal values.  Stevenson's novel presents an entirely different view of lawyers from 
that given in Inglis' address.  Where Inglis portrays lawyers as the guardians of public and 
private right, in Catriona, the lawyers subvert and manipulate constitutional rights for their 
own political and personal ends.  In Catriona the fiction's truly dialogic qualities arise from 
the nature of the relationship between criminal law and politics, between the Ciceronian 
values of ius and virtu, so much a part of Scottish Enlightenment discourse.  Where Inglis 
traces these values through history and asserts their presence as a positive influence on the 
later nineteenth century legal establishment, they are revealed as deeply problematic in 
Catriona.  Stevenson thus takes a much more pessimistic view of the role of lawyers in the 
post-Union settlement.   
 
Some modern commentators have begun to analyse the role lawyers played in the later 
nineteenth century in terms similar to Stevenson.  Harvie has described the late nineteenth 
century profession as retreating into 'legalism' and away from national and constitutional 
concerns at a time when these were becoming increasing important in other European 
jurisdictions.63  David McCrone has observed that as far as local politics were concerned, late 
nineteenth century Edinburgh provides an example where 'the lawyers and professional men 
withdrew from local political affairs, leaving the town council to be run by small landlords 
and shopkeepers'.64 
 
But if Inglis, Lorimer and Stevenson are divided in their analyses, all of them are agreed on 
the centrality of politics to law and its historical process.  Their variety of texts are no 
kailyard lockups for Scottish history or politics.  They are coherent and eloquent pleas for the 
historical relationship between politics and law in Scotland to be taken seriously.   
 
                                                
their subject as a progressive broadening of human rights, in which good 'forward-
looking' liberals were continuously struggling with the backward-looking conservatives' 
Ernst Mayer, 'When is Historiography Whiggish?', Journal of the History of Ideas, 51 (1990), 
p.301, quoting H. Butterfield, the Whig Interpretation of History, London, 1931.  We could 
compare such 'progressive broadening of human rights' to the mocking irony of the 
description of the advocates at the Inveraray trial: 
The Writer was led into some hot expressions; Colstoun must take him up and set him 
right; the rest joined in on different sides, but all pretty noisy; the Duke of Argyle was 
beaten like a blanket; King George came in for a few digs in the by-going and a great 
deal of rather elaborate defence 
63 Cencrastus, op.cit, pp.39-40.  Harvie's interpretation presents an interesting contrast to that 
of J.W. Cairns in his account of the Faculty of Advocates in the Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia, op.cit, vol.13, paras 1269-84. 
64 Understanding Scotland, op.cit, p. 131.  See also McCrone, D, & Elliott, B., Property and 
Power in a City: The Sociological Significance of Landlordism (Macmillan, London, 1989) 
